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PUTTING THE MEANINGFUL BACK IN MEANINGFUL
REVIEw: DETAINEE LITIGATION IN A POST
LATIF WORLD
Tony Scardino*
"It is ny life but who is going to leave ne alone? Who is
going to rescue ne from what I am going through?"
-Adnan Farhan Abd Al Latif,
writing to his attorney, David Remes'
"The critical question here is why the Supreme Court contin-
ies to deny cert. And of course the answer is, Guantanaino
detainees have no constituency. Nobody except Covington
and other great lawyers are ip there fighting for thein. Bti it
begs the question that is really at the bottom of this whole
gathering today: [w]hat is the fate of these people?"
-Retired Federal Judge James Robertson2
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States faces considerable pressure, both domestically and
internationally, to reevaluate its administration of detainees captured in the
"Global War On Terrorism." The events of September 11, 2001 forced na-
tions to question basic assumptions of wartime operations-particularly
procedures regarding detainees originating from areas outside of declared
battlefields.' As of Adnan Al Latif's death on September 10, 2012, there
* First, and foremost, the author would like to thank his beautiful wife Katy. Without your
support, none of my successes would be possible. I would also like to thank Professor John Anderson
for his guidance and patience throughout this project. Additionally, a special thank you is appropriate
for CPTs Michael Brown and Jonathan Bullock for their mentorship as both officers and attorneys.
Lastly, I would like to thank the Mississippi College Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Sarah
Boehme, for her thoughtful comments and insight.
1. Andy Worthington, A Cry for Help from Guantanamo. Adnan Latif Asks, "Who Is Going to
Rescue Me From the Injustice and the Torture I Am Enduring?" (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.andyworth-
ington.co.uk/2011/02/10/a-cry-for-help-from-guantanamo-adnan-latif-asks-who-is-going-to-rescue-me-
from-the-injustice-and-the-torture-i-am-enduring/.
2. Panel Discussion on Boumediene's Legacy and the Fate of Guantanamo Detainees at Cov-
ington & Burling, LLP (July 17, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/Transcript-from-Panel-DiscussionBoumediene.pdf. Judge Robertson retired from the District
Court of the District of Columbia in 2010.
3. To be fair, there are serious international implications that the United States government
must consider. No political party wishes to be responsible for releasing a detainee who then later
carries out a terrorist attack. See generally Thomas Joscelyn, Return to lihad, THE LONG WAR JOTR-
NAL (Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/return-to-jihad.php.
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are currently 167 "enemy combatants" housed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Supreme Court have publicly
squabbled over the rights of detainees in the United States judicial system,
and no simple answer is readily available. Since the landmark case of
Bounediene v. Bush,5 detainees are guaranteed a "meaningful review" of
their detention through federal habeas corpus petitions.'
Habeas petitions are essential judicial counterbalances to the largely
unrestricted power of the Executive Branch to detain foreign citizens ac-
cused of terrorist acts. However, the right to a habeas hearing does not
guarantee justice for detainees, and it certainly does not ensure federal
courts will apply generally accepted rules of procedure. The battlefields of
Iraq and Afghanistan are volatile areas. The flow of intelligence collection
often results in detention of individuals under circumstances abhorrent to
the sensibilities of legal scholars.7 The question therein lies, if courts must
apply a "meaningful review"' standard for habeas petitions, what will that
actually mean in practice for detainee litigation?
In Latif v. Obama,' the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals seems to answer
this question by establishing peculiar evidentiary and procedural principles.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's order to release Adnan Al
Latif and ruled the district court did not give proper deference to a classi-
fied Government intelligence report in its findings of fact.o The court con-
cluded that the uncorroborated intelligence report must be given a
"presumption of regularity" and that "in the absence of other clear evi-
dence a detainee's self-serving account must be credible-not just plausi-
ble-to overcome presumptively reliable government evidence.""
To understand "meaningful review" and its rapidly developing body of
federal common law, this Note will first explore the history of habeas peti-
tions in detainee litigation and general trends of case resolution. Next, this
Note will argue the D.C. Court of Appeals erred and essentially ignored
the concept of "meaningful review" when it established a "presumption of
regularity"' in the instant case. Further, the Note will argue the court of
4. Charlie Savage, Military Identifies Guantanamo Detainee Who Died, N.Y. TINIES (Sept. 11,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/politics/detainee-who-died-at-guantanamo-had-release-
blocked-by-court.html.
5. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
6. Id. at 783.
7. There is a saying throughout the United States military that intelligence gathering is more of
an "art" than a science. This is of course little comfort to detainees who are arrested by sources of
questionable value and truthfulness.
8. Bounzediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
9. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
10. Id. at 1176. Latif's intelligence file has not been declassified, and the court's opinion is re-
dacted in several areas. Wikileaks released what is purported to be a Detainee Assessment file on
Latif, and that file has been widely circulated in the mainstream media. Though this author believes
that Latif's file should not remain classified, and likely should have never been classified in the first
place, the fact remains that its use and dissemination violates federal law. The author will not be party
to such violations, and will only cite unclassified information from the court's opinion or other scholarly
sources.
11. Id. at 1199.
12. Id. at 1198.
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appeals erred by evaluating the district court's findings of fact essentially de
novo and without proper "clear error" deference. Lastly, this Note will
recommend a workable solution for evidentiary standards that not only
considers the proper use of Government intelligence reports, but also rec-
ognizes the difficulties faced by United States prosecutors in detainee
litigation.
II. FACTs AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2001, Pakistani forces detained Adnan Farhan Abd Al Latif, a
Yemeni citizen, on the Pakistani side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 1
Latif did not have a passport or other means of identification.1 5 Latif was
subsequently relocated to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in January of 2002.6
The United States Government maintained that "Ibrahim Al-Alawai" re-
cruited Latif for the purposes of joining the Taliban and fighting the North-
ern Alliance. 7 The Government's sole piece of evidence introduced at
trial was an Intelligence Report ("Report"), which had been deeply cen-
sored." The Report stated that Ibrahim first spoke to Latif sometime in
the year 2000." Ibrahim encouraged Latif to join the fight against the
Northern Alliance and convinced him to meet at the Grand Mosque in
Kandahar, Afghanistan.20 Latif left Yemen in August 2001 and visited
Ibrahim for three days in Kandahar.'1 Ibrahim then brought Latif to a
Taliban camp where he received introductory training before assignment to
Abu Fazl, a Taliban commander in the Kabul area. According to the Re-
port, Latif did not engage in any direct combat while in Kabul, but did
"[see] a lot of people killed during the bombings." Latif left Kabul some-
time during the fighting and went to Pakistan through the city of
Jalalabad.2' Latif was eventually captured by the Pakistani military and
handed over to United States forces. 5
Latif denied the United States' characterization of his travels.26 Latif
stated he first met Ibrahim at a "charitable organization" while in Yemen.
Latif further stated that in 1994 he was involved in a car wreck that left him
with severe head injuries.28 Because of his injuries, he traveled to Pakistan
13. Id. at 1216.
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to find Ibrahim. Upon arriving in Pakistan, Latif discovered that Ibrahim
was in Kabul.3 0 He then went to Kabul and found Ibrahim at an Islamic
school." Shortly thereafter, Ibrahim left and told Latif to stay in Kabul
until Ibrahim could return. Latif waited in Kabul for a few weeks before
fleeing the approaching American forces. Latif did not contend that he
was forced to speak to Government interrogators or that he did not make
statements to any officials. Latif instead claimed that he was either "mis-
understood" or "misattributed" and that the Report "bears no relation to
what he actually said."3 5
Latif challenged his detention through a habeas petition to the District
Court of the District of Columbia." At trial, the Government could not, or
would not, produce the original notes upon which the Report was based.
The district court, in granting Latif's petition, ruled that the court "could
not 'credit [the Report] because there is serious question as to whether [the
Report] accurately reflects Latif's words, the incriminating facts [in the Re-
port] are not corroborated, and Latif has presented a plausible alternative
story to explain his travel.' "
Judge Janice Rogers Brown, writing for the panel of the Circuit Court
of the District of Columbia, reversed and remanded the district court's or-
der. 9 Judge Brown required the district court to reevaluate Latif's petition
"in light of the totality of the evidence, including newly available evidence
as appropriate."4 0 Judge Karen Henderson wrote a concurrence agreeing
with Judge Brown's findings, but would have instead simply rendered con-
tinued detention without further proceedings. 1 Judge David Tatel wrote a
dissenting opinion in support of the district court's grant of release.
Judge Tatel would have upheld the district court's finding that the Report
was inherently unreliable, and further applied a "highly deferential clear
error review." Latif then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which denied a Writ of Certiorari on April 27, 2012."* Latif died while still








36. Id. at 1178.
37. Id. at 1177.
38. Id. at 1178. At the time of the circuit court's review the Government claimed to be able to
produce the notes, but did not do so before the ruling. Id. at 1177.
39. Id. at 1176.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1200 (Henderson, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 1206 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Latif v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2741, 2741 (2012).
45. Savage, supra note 4.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Habeas Corpus Rights of Detainees
"Enemy combatant" habeas corpus petitions were first granted to
American citizens detained on United States soil in the 2004 case of Handi
v. Runsfeld."6 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court, ruled
that if the Executive chooses to detain citizens of the United States, the
"enemy combatant [must] be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker."17 For the
purposes of the Court's review, the Government defined "enemy combat-
ant status" as an "individual who . . . was 'part of or supporting forces
hostile to the United States or coalition partners"' and who "'engaged in
armed conflict with the United States.' "4
The Northern Alliance captured Yaser Esam Hamdi, a naturalized
American citizen, and subsequently transferred him to United States cus-
tody.49 Hamdi, through his father as a next friend petitioner, argued his
detention without trial violated his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights
under the United States Constitution.5 0 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed a district court order appointing counsel for Hamdi, and
Hamdi subsequently filed for writ of habeas corpus to the United States
Supreme Court.5 ' During remand at the district court, the Government
produced a signed affidavit by a Defense Department official that outlined
the Government's allegations and acted as the "sole evidentiary support"
for Hamdi's continued detention.
In review of Hamdi's petition, Justice O'Connor first examined the
legality of detaining citizens as "enemy combatants," ruling that "Congress
has in fact authorized Hamdi's detention, through the [Authorization for
Use of Military Force].5 ' However, detention is limited to "the duration of
the particular conflict in which [detainees] were captured."5 4 Further, "ab-
sent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every indi-
vidual detained within the United States."5 5
Balancing the detainees' liberty against the Government's interest in
protecting its citizens requires careful consideration, but the detainee is in-
herently afforded a "fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
46. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 516.
49. Id. at 510.
50. Id. at 511.
51. Id. at 516.
52. Id. at 512.
53. Id. at 517. Congress "passed [this resolution] authorizing the President to 'use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, author-
ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks' or 'harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions, or persons.' Id. at 510 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2,
115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
54. Id. at 518.
55. Id. at 525.
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assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."5 ' This fair opportunity does
not necessarily negate the use of hearsay or even a "presumption in favor
of the Government's evidence" if the evidence is "credible evidence that
the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria."5  Justice
O'Connor wrote "the threats to military operations posed by a basic system
of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen's core rights
to challenge meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an
impartial adjudicator."5 8 As to the weight of evidence in habeas petition
review, Justice O'Connor ruled that the Government's "proposed 'some
evidence' standard is inadequate."5 ' Evidence such as affidavits may be
introduced "so long as [the court] also permits the alleged combatant to
present his own factual case to rebut the Government's return."o
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of habeas relief to non-citi-
zens in the 2008 case of Boionediene v. Bush." The opinion, written by
Justice Kennedy, ruled that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)12
was an insufficient safeguard for providing appropriate review of detainee's
"enemy combatant" status.63 Congress attempted to deny habeas rights
under the DTA by providing that "'no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'" 6  Congress passed the DTA in di-
rect response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Rasul v. Bush, 5 which
granted detainees habeas review in civilian courts.6 6 Justice Kennedy first
explored the history of the writ, noting "[t]he Framers foresaw that the
United States would expand and acquire new territories," and that the
"Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dis-
pose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its
terms apply."6 7 Further, it would be illogical "[t]o hold the political
branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off."68 Though
Justice Kennedy conceded that some types of "procedural safeguards"
could be instituted to "eliminate the need for habeas corpus review," the
DTA provisions "fell short."6 ' The Combat Status Review Tribunals
56. Id. at 533.
57. Id. at 534.
58. Id. at 535.
59. Id. at 537.
60. Id. at 538.
61. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
62. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
63. Bounediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
64. Id. at 735 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat.
224 (2001)).
65. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
66. Bounediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
67. Id. at 755, 765.
68. Id. at 765.
69. Id. at 767.
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(CSRT's) did not provide actual counsel to detainees, only "Personal Rep-
resentatives" who were not even considered "advocates." 0 The limited re-
view provided by the DTA in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals allowed
the court "only to assess whether the CSRT complied with the 'standards
and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense' and whether those
standards and procedures are lawful." But "[e]ven if [the court] were to
assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process standards" Justice Kennedy
wrote, "there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of
fact."79 As such, "the court that conducts the habeas proceeding must have
the means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings.""
Lastly, Justice Kennedy concluded that the District Court of the District of
Columbia is capable of balancing the needs of protecting national security
and the liberty of detainees, and that the court "will use its discretion to
accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.""
B. "Presumption of Regularity"
Haindi, Bowonediene, and Rasul collectively establish the right to
habeas proceedings for enemy combatant detainees; however, these cases
fail to establish concrete procedure for district courts to follow. 5 Wartime
operations create unique challenges for collecting and producing evidence
at trial, particularly in the case of Government intelligence reports. Justice
O'Connor suggested in Haindi that a "presumption" in favor of the govern-
ment's evidence might be appropriate if the evidence is "credible."" His-
torically, the United States Supreme Court has presumed Government
"good faith" and "regularity" of Government actions: "[t]he presumption
of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence
of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume they have properly dis-
charged their official duties.""
70. Id.
71. Id. at 729 (quoting Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2)(C), 28 U.S.C.A § 2241 (2005)).
72. Id. at 785.
73. Id. at 786.
74. Id. at 796.
75. The true failure of Bounediene, as will be argued throughout this Note, is the lack of speci-
fied structural controls to ensure fair habeas proceedings. The district courts are certainly capable of
sitting as expert factfinders. In most instances they can be trusted to create judicially sound and funda-
mentally fair common law. But in detainee litigation the stakes are so high that firm and structured
leadership of the Supreme Court becomes essential. Evidentiary standards are not mundane details-
they are essentially the most important question courts must answer. The reliability of Government
intelligence reports, often translated or interpreted by non United States citizens or based on purely
hearsay evidence, strikes at the heart of whether the United States detained a true terrorist or an
innocent bystander. American jurisprudence typically errs on the side of caution, allowing criminals to
walk free for protection of those that might be innocent. Detainee litigation, for better or worse, oper-
ates to the inverse of that philosophy.
76. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004).
77. United States v. Chem. Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
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In the case of Sussman v. United States Marshall Service," the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the actions of public offi-
cials and the "presumption" that they act in good-faith." The court, in
determining the sufficiency of disclosures by the United States Marshall
Service to freedom of information act requests, ruled that "[a]gencies are
entitled to a presumption that they complied with the obligation to disclose
reasonably segregable material."o However, "[t]he quantum of evidence
required to overcome that presumption is not clear."" In the instant case,
Judge Brown uses this "presumption" of Government "good faith" to
credit intelligence reports with a "presumption of regularity."89
C. Clear Error Review in Federal Courts
As evidentiary standards and findings of facts are key components in
detainee litigation, evaluation of those findings on appeal becomes even
more significant. The limited role of appellate review is an accepted princi-
ple demonstrated throughout American jurisprudence, and this concept
should apply to habeas proceedings no less then any other civil or criminal
claim. The Supreme Court plainly ruled that findings of fact should "be
overturned [on appeal] only if they are . . . 'clearly erroneous.'"" The
"clearly erroneous" standard operates most forcefully in the context of wit-
ness credibility; the district court uniquely views such testimony firsthand.
The Court addressed clear error review thoroughly in the case of An-
derson v. City of Bessemer City,85 a civil rights action in which the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the Western District Court of North Carolina erred in its
determination that the plaintiff suffered gender-based discrimination.
The district court adopted the plaintiff's findings of fact in its ruling, and
the Fourth Circuit stated in reversal that this adoption was improper, and
would therefore invalidate the standard deference of clear error review.87
The Supreme Court held that though it discouraged such behavior, "even
when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are
those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous."8 8 The
appellate court cannot "reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply be-
cause it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently."89
Further, "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."9O
78. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 1117 (citing Boyd v. Crim. Div. U.S. D.O.J., 475 F.3d 381, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
83. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 295 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499-501 (1984).
85. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
86. Id. at 566.
87. Id. at 571.
88. Id. at 572.
89. Id. at 573.
90. Id. at 574. (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949)).
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D. Application of Evidentiary Standards in Detainee Litigation
Review of the forgoing principles in detainee litigation reflects a
strained effort by the court of appeals to create a "common law" of rules
and procedure in habeas proceedings." One of the first cases to reach the
court post Boionediene, Al-Bihani v. Obana,'2 questioned not only the le-
gality of Al-Bihani's detention, but also the use of hearsay evidence to
meet the "preponderance of the evidence" burden imposed on the Govern-
ment." Al-Bihani admitted to membership with the 55th Arab Brigade, an
affiliate of the Taliban fighting the Northern Alliance." Judge Janice
Brown, writing for the panel, first noted that "[h]abeas review for Guanta-
namo detainees need not match procedures developed by Congress and the
courts specifically for habeas challenges to criminal convictions."9 5 The Su-
preme Court in Bowonediene instead encouraged "'innovation' of habeas
procedure by lower courts, granting leeway for [c]ertain accommodations
[to] be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place on
the military.'"" Furthermore, "had the district court imposed stringent
standards of evidence in the first instance, the government may well have
been obligated to go beyond Al-Bihani's interrogation records and into the
battlefield to present a case that met its burden.""
As for hearsay evidence, its use is condoned despite the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause, because "the Confrontation Clause applies
only in criminal prosecutions," while Al-Bihani's petition instead required
review of his status as an enemy combatant." Judge Brown concluded that
"the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not
whether it is admissible-it is always admissible-but what probative
weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits."" Judge
Brown observed that district courts are "experienced and sophisticated fact
finders," and therefore it would be appropriate to let the presiding judge
determine the proper weight of the hearsay in combination with all of the
circumstances surrounding the detainees' petition. 00 In Al-Bihani's case,
he "did not contest the truth of the majority of his admissions upon which
the district court relied, enhancing the reliability of those reports."1o
The circuit court further explored the appropriate reliance on hearsay
evidence in the case of Barhowoni v. Obana,10 2 decided shortly after Al-
Bihani. Barhoumi, an Algerian born fighter, was captured in Afghanistan
91. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
92. Id at 869.
93. Id. at 875-76.
94. Id. at 869.
95. Id. at 876.
96. Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008)).
97. Id. at 877-78.
98. Id. at 879.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id.
102. Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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and subsequently transferred to Guantanamo Bay. o3 The district court de-
nied Barhoumi's habeas petition based not only on his own admissions, but
also the writings of an associate who was determined to be a material sup-
porter of enemy fighters."o" Judge David Tatel, writing for the panel, first
rejected Barhoumi's argument that the district court erred when it admit-
ted hearsay evidence outside of the seven day time frame required under
the district court's CMO (court management order).os Judge Tatel ruled
that the court itself is not bound by the CMO, and that based on the diffi-
culties faced by the Government in detainee litigation, the hearsay evi-
dence was proper and necessary for appropriately determining the
sufficiency of Barhoumi's petition.o
Further, Judge Tatel cited Al-Bihiani in ruling that the district court
was within its rights to admit hearsay evidence, but must determine what
weight to accord the hearsay in ruling to grant or deny the habeas peti-
tion.' Lastly, Judge Tatel analyzed whether the district court erred in its
determination that the hearsay was sufficiently reliable to deny Barhoumi's
petition.o Judge Tatel found ample evidence to conclude that Barhoumi
was part of the militia referenced in the hearsay writings because "the al-
Suri diary-a veritable membership list-expressly states that Barhoumi
(referred to by his alias Ubaydah al-Jaza'iri) was a 'Permanent' member of
Zubaydah's militia and that he was providing explosives training to other
members intending to fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan." 0 ' Judge Tatel ex-
tensively examined the hearsay documents themselves, concluding "the al-
Suri diary contains sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the district
court's reliance on it." 1 o
Though the court made clear in Al-Bihiani and Barhioloni that hearsay
evidence would bolster the Government's ability to meet its evidentiary
burden, the Government is still required to show that the detainee was
actually affiliated with a terrorist organization to justify continued deten-
tion. Decided within days of Barhoroni, Bensayah v. Obana... exemplifies
the appropriate judicial review standard for weighing Government evi-
dence. Bensayah was captured in Bosnia and accused of planning to bomb
the United States Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnia eventually turned Ben-
sayah over to American officials after failing to produce adequate evidence
to charge him for the alleged conspiracy.11 3
The district court, in review of Bensayah's petition, ruled that the Gov-
ernment "'met its burden by providing additional evidence that sufficiently
103. Id. at 418.
104. Id. at 420.
105. Id. at 420-21.
106. Id. at 421-22.
107. Id. at 422.
108. Id. at 423.
109. Id. at 426-27.
110. Id. at 428.
111. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 720.
113. Id.
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corroborates its allegations from this unnamed source that Bensayah is an
al-Qaida facilitator."' 11 4 However, subsequent to the district court's ruling,
the Government changed its position, arguing instead that Bensayah was
actually a member of Al-Qaeda and that his alleged Al-Qaeda contact may
not have been a senior facilitator within the organization.1 15 Judge Doug-
las Ginsburg, writing for the three-judge panel, noted that the district court
relied primarily on a redacted government intelligence report to determine
that Bensayah was an Al-Qaeda facilitator."' The district court concluded
that the report by itself was not reliable, but taken with the information
linking Bensayah to the alleged senior Al-Qaeda facilitator, the informa-
tion was corroborated and therefore met the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard."' Nevertheless, because the Government abandoned its
position concerning the alleged facilitator, the report must be read sepa-
rately to prove that Bensayah was truly a member of Al-Qaeda.11" There-
fore, Judge Ginsburg reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the
case back for further fact-finding.11 '
Conversely, the court of appeals will overturn district court rulings
granting habeas relief when it finds sufficient evidence to determine actual
membership in terrorist organizations. In the cases of Al-Adalz v.
Obaina1 20 and Abnerfedi v. Obaina,1 21 the circuit court found petitioners
were, by a preponderance of the evidence, actual members of Al-Qaeda.
Judge A. Raymond Randolph, writing for the three-judge panel in Al-
Adal, rejected the district court's contention that by itself, each piece of
evidence advanced by the Government was insufficient for continued de-
tention.12 Taken as a whole, the weight of the evidence indicated "Al-
Adahi was-at the very least-more likely than not a part of al-Qaida. 112
Similarly, Judge Silberman, writing for the three-judge panel in Alnerfedi,
ruled that the petitioner's implausible exculpatory statements, taken with
the other evidence of membership, combined to prove affiliation by the
preponderance standard. ' 4 Judge Silberman held on appeal, "[the district
court's] specific factual determinations are reviewed for clear error,
whereas its ultimate determination-whether a detainee's conduct justifies
detention-is a question of law reviewed de novo.1)5
Intelligence reports are in many cases the sole evidence offered by the
Government to prove membership in terrorist organizations. The court of
appeals upheld their use in Kahn v. Obaina if the evidence "'contain[s]
114. Id. at 721-22.
115. Id. at 722.
116. Id. at 725.
117. Id at 725-26.
118. Id. at 726.
119. Id.
120. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
121. Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
122. Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105.
123. Id. at 1106.
124. Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 7.
125. Id. at 5 (citing Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
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sufficient indicia' of reliability, and . . . the government's declaration . . .
accurately represents the information contained in the reports."1 2 6 Kahn
was accused of membership in Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), a terrorist
organization that materially supported Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. ' The
district court requested, and received before ruling, unredacted versions of
the intelligence reports and statements by Army intelligence officers who
interrogated Kahn.1 2' The district court ruled that the unredacted version
of the reports and the statements by Army officials corroborated otherwise
unreliable declarations by Government informants, and taken as a whole,
met the preponderance of the evidence standard necessary for continued
detention.m Judge Merrick Garland, writing for the panel, affirmed this
ruling, citing the detail of the reports, the Army officials' corroboration of
the informant hearsay, and Kahn's own statements of past affiliation in
HIG.13 0
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Judge Brown's Majority Opinion
Circuit Judge Janice Rogers Brown issued the majority opinion for the
three Judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.13 1 Judge Brown
outlined three errors assigned to the district court's ruling. 13  First, the Re-
port must be given a "presumption of regularity."1 33 Second, the district
court should have weighed Latif's "credibility" against the Report's version
of his travels in Afghanistan. 13  Finally, the district court should not have
"atomized" the government's evidence during its findings of fact.135
1. Intelligence Reports and the "Presumptions of Regularity"
In review of the district court's fact-finding function, Judge Brown
stated "specific factual determinations" are evaluated under a standard of
clear error. 136 Therefore Judge Brown "assume[d], without deciding, that
the district court was correct to hold the Government to the preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard."13 7
However, Judge Brown ruled that the district court "expressly refused
to accord a presumption of regularity to the Government's evidence" and
126. Kahn v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Kahn v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1,
17 (D.D.C. 2010)).
127. Id. at 21.
128. Id. at 24-25.
129. Id. at 25.
130. Id. at 30.
131. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2011). President George W. Bush appointed





136. Id. at 1178 (quoting Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
137. Id. (citing Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 5).
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as such, would not be afforded deference in its conclusions.' Judge
Brown compared government documents to "official acts of public of-
ficers," which, unless there is "clear evidence to the contrary," are pre-
sumed to "have properly discharged their official duties.""' Judge Brown
observed that because documents like the Report are created in essentially
imperfect circumstances, the standard "he-said/she-said balancing of ordi-
nary evidence" would be improper in detainee litigation.140 Though the
court had not previously ruled on evidentiary presumptions in detainee liti-
gation, Judge Brown found parallel authority in Handi v. Runsfeld:
[T]he Constitution would not be offended by a presumption
in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that pre-
sumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity
for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government
puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner
meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to
the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive
evidence that he falls outside the criteria.1 4 1
Further, Judge Brown noted that the Supreme Court allows lower
courts to determine the specifics of "workable habeas remed[ies]."" As
such, Judge Brown felt a presumption of regularity would create a practical
method of addressing habeas petitions while maintaining a "modest judicial
role."14 Judge Brown wrote that in essence, documents like the Report
contain "two distinct actors-the non-government source and the govern-
ment official who summarizes (or transcribes) the source's statement. "144
It is to this second actor, the government official, that Judge Brown applied
the "presumption of regularity."14 5 Moreover, this presumption "does not
compel a determination that the [document] establishes what it is offered
to prove."1 4
Judge Brown took the Supreme Court's "implicit invitation to inno-
vate" as sufficient authority to create a presumption of regularity for gov-
ernment intelligence reports.14 1 Judge Brown ruled that "courts have no
special expertise in evaluating the nature and reliability of the Executive
branch's wartime records," and as such, "judicial modesty" is para-
mount.14 8 "Familiar[ity]" with the intelligence cycle and collection meth-
ods were not necessary, and it is correct to assume proper decision-making
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
140. Id. at 1179.
141. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1180.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1181.
147. Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008)).
148. Id. at 1182.
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by Executive branch actors.' If the court required further examination of
such methods, "the government may well have been obligated to go be-
yond .... interrogation records and into the battlefield to present a case that
met its burden."15 0
In review of recent cases in which the court did not apply a presump-
tion of regularity, Judge Brown stated that the court either applied the pre-
sumption or the appeal did not address the issue.15' According to Judge
Brown, the instant case was the first in which the detainee "force[d] the
issue" by questioning the accuracy of the Report and the Government
"persists in its request for a presumption of regularity on appeal."15' Judge
Brown ruled that any alleged inaccuracies by Latif were not sufficient to
rebut the presumption of regularity by the report, and that "[t]he quantum
of incriminating detail in the Report could hardly be produced by good-
faith mistake, and [the court] will not infer bad-faith fabrication absent any
evidence to that effect."153 Any "inconsistencies in the Report may suggest
a document produced on the field by imperfect translators or transcribers,
but they do not prove the Report's description of Latif's incriminating
statements [are] fundamentally unreliable. "154
2. Witness "Credibility" versus Witness "Plausibility"
Concerning Latif's credibility as a witness, Judge Brown wrote that
Latif's case was decided a week after the court held in a separate habeas
petition that "'[o]ne of the oddest things' about [the] case was that . . . the
district court never made any findings about whether [the detainee] was
generally a credible witness or whether his particular explanations for his
actions were worthy of belief.' "155 To overcome the presumption, the dis-
trict court was "obligated to consider [Latif's] credibility" and "[o]nly a
credible story could overcome the presumption of regularity to which the
Report was entitled."1 5  Judge Brown rejected Latif's argument that by
failing to address his "credibility" directly, the district court essentially
ruled that he rebutted any presumption created by the Report.1 5' Further,
the mere "plausibility" of Latif's version of events is not enough to "rebut
the presumption of regularity," and "[i]t is when a detainee tells a plausible
story that an evaluation of his credibility is most needed."15' Lastly, Judge
Brown ruled that there was not enough information in the district court's
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1183 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d at 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
151. Id. at 1183-85 (citing Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Barhoumi v. Obama,
609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Kahn v. Obama, 655
F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
152. Id. at 1185.
153. Id. at 1188.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1190 (quoting Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
156. Id. at 1190.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1191-92.
[VOL. 32:503516
2014] PUTTING MEANINGFUL BACK IN MEANINGFUL REVIEW 517
decision to determine whether, even if a presumption of regularity was ap-
plied, that the court would have granted Latif's release.
3. Evidentiary "Atomization"
As to the third assigned error, Judge Brown held that the district court
failed to "view the evidence collectively rather in isolation." 6 o Though
clear error review typically applies to findings of fact,"' Judge Brown
wrote that this failure was actually a misapplication of law.1 12 A detainee
"is not entitled to habeas just because no single piece of evidence is suffi-
cient by itself to justify his detention."' In essence, the district court "at-
omized" the available evidence."' Further, "[w]hat makes Latif's current
story so hard to swallow is not its intrinsic implausibility but its correspon-
dence in so many respects with the Report he now repudiates."16 5 Conse-
quently, Judge Brown ruled that the district court ignored aspects of the
report improperly and should have placed less weight on Latif's own state-
ments.166 Because of these errors, Judge Brown remanded the instant case
back to the district court with instructions to give proper deference to the
Report, weigh all evidence in the light of the presumption, and determine
the credibility of Latif's statements.1 7
B. Judge Henderson's Concurring Opinion
Judge Karen Henderson wrote a concurring opinion that agreed in
part to Judge Brown's conclusions, but would have simply reversed the dis-
trict court's release of Latif and rendered continued detention.' Judge
Henderson disagreed with the dissent's contention that the court mistak-
enly found clear error in the district court's opinion."' She wrote that the
court must "assure ourselves that the district court's finding is 'permissible'
or 'plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.'" 17 0 Therefore,
"the clear error standard requires us, as the reviewing court, to assess the
comparative weight of the evidence both for and against the district court's
finding."17 1 Judge Henderson stated that under this "clear error frame-
work" the district court should have given higher deference to the Report
159. Id at 1191.
160. Id. at 1193.
161. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985).
162. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1193.
163. Id. (citing Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
164. Idat 1194.
165. Id at 1193.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1199.
168. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring). President H.W. Bush appointed Judge Henderson to the
circuit court in 1990.
169. Id. at 1200.
170. Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
171. Id. at 1201.
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and less deference to any inconsistencies it may have contained.1 12 Be-
cause the Report is accorded a "presumption of regularity," Judge Hender-
son wrote that remand "w[ould] be a waste of time and judicial
resources."173
C. Judge Tatel's Dissenting Opinion
Judge David Tatel authored the dissenting opinion, arguing that the
district court's grant of habeas relief should be upheld, and that the court
properly weighed the evidence in its ruling for Latif."17  Judge Tatel wrote
that in the instant case, a ruling to reverse the district court would be a
"first among Guantanamo habeas appeals in this circuit: never before have
we reviewed a habeas grant to a Guantanamo detainee where all concede
that if the district court's fact findings are sustained, then detention is un-
lawful."175 Essentially, the court "move[d] the goal posts" by disregarding
the district court's decision to find the Report "unreliable."1 7 ' Further,
Judge Tatel stated that the court never actually "conclud[ed] that the dis-
trict court's particular take on the evidence was clearly erroneous. "177
Judge Tatel sectioned his dissent into two areas of discussion: first, the dis-
trict court did not err in discounting the Report without a "presumption of
regularity," and second, proper application of clear error review would re-
sult in affirming the district court's findings.17 1
1. "Regularity" or "Reliability?"
Judge Tatel began his dissent by reviewing the majority's parallel anal-
ysis between actions of public officials and the documents they generate.17 9
He wrote that cases in this line of analysis "have something in common:
actions taken or documents produced within a process that is generally reli-
able because it is, for example, transparent, accessible, and often famil-
iar."18o Conversely, "the Report at issue here was produced in the fog of
war by a clandestine method that we know almost nothing about." 8
Judge Tatel perceived these conditions as highly distinguishable from the
regularity assumed in standard government documents, precisely because
of the issues noted by the majority: documents "prepared in stressful and
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1204-05.
174. Id. at 1227 (Tatel, J., dissenting). President William Clinton appointed Judge Tatel to the
circuit in 2004.
175. Id. at 1206.
176. Id. at 1206.




181. Id. at 1208.
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chaotic conditions, filtered through interpreters, subject to transcription er-
rors, and heavily redacted for national security purposes."1 8 2 In essence, it
is not "regularity" that is of concern, but "reliability."1 83
While the Executive Branch likely acts in "good faith," detainees must
be afforded a "'meaningful opportunity' to subject the Executive's deten-
tion decisions to scrutiny by an independent Article III court.' "184 Judge
Tatel did not assert that all government documents like the Report are un-
reliable, only that "we should refrain from categorically affording it pre-
sumptions one way or the other."18 5 Further, Judge Tatel noted numerous
habeas proceedings avoided applying a "presumption of regularity," and
that by analyzing the evidence carefully and thoroughly against the back-
drop of the circumstances in which the evidence was presented, the court
essentially rejected inherent presumptions.1 8'6 Additionally, in Kahn v.
Obaina, Judge Tatel cited extensive discussion in the court's opinion re-
viewing the sufficiency of the Government's evidence.18 1
Judge Tatel admitted that the court must conduct "a careful and con-
scious balancing of the important interests at stake," especially in the con-
text of hearsay evidence.18 8 But the presumption of regularity "disturbs
this careful balance, substituting a presumption in place of careful district
court 'review and assess[ment of] all evidence from both sides."' 1 89 As
such, requiring district courts to presume the reliability of Government evi-
dence encroaches on their fundamental fact-finding role. 90 Judge Tatel
also disagreed with the majority's reading of Haindi v. Rwnsfeld, conclud-
ing that a presumption should only apply to "credible" evidence, which
therefore inherently envisions a role for the court to weigh and determine
first if the evidence is actually "credible" and worthy of the presumption.''
He feared that by taking all documents the Government produces as true,
the Supreme Court's "meaningful review" standard would no longer be
truly "meaningful" in application.19 2
182. Id. (quoting Id. at 1179 (majority opinion)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1209 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 729 (2008)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1210 (citing Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
187. Id. at 1211 (citing Kahn v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 27-32 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1212 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1214 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004)).
192. Id. at 1215.
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2. Clear Error Review in Detainee Litigation
By utilizing the proper standard of clear error review, Judge Tatel
wrote that he would have affirmed the lower court's opinion." The Re-
port was heavily redacted, did not show whether multiple parties contrib-
uted to its contents, and could not be corroborated by the Government."'
The district court rightly questioned the lack of corroboration and that
-[n]o other detainee told interrogators that he fled from Afghanistan to
Pakistan, from Tora Bora or any other location, with Latif." 1 5 As the Re-
port admittedly contained factual inconsistencies, it was not clear error to
question its accuracy.19 6
Lastly, Judge Tatel agreed with the district court's ruling that the Gov-
ernment's other evidence was insufficient for continued detention.'9 La-
tif's return from Afghanistan through the border of Pakistan was a
common route for evacuees during his capture; it would be appropriate for
the district court to discount such evidence. 98 Additionally, it was within
the district court's discretion to disbelieve that Ibrahim Alawi, the man La-
tif sought out in Afghanistan, was actually an Al Qaeda or Taliban re-
cruiter.' 99 All of these pieces of circumstantial evidence could point to
Latif's association with terrorist groups, but it would not be clear error for
the district court to conclude otherwise.
V. ANALYSIS
Judge Brown's majority opinion signaled a new and somewhat dis-
turbing divergence in detainee litigation that will significantly alter the fu-
ture of habeas corpus review. Latif reflects a growing movement by the
D.C. Circuit to uphold indefinite detention despite obvious deficiencies in
Government intelligence reports.201 Prior to the 2010 decision of Al-Adahi
v Obana, the district court granted relief in 56% of petitions.2 Of the
193. Id. at 1216.
194. Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The Government claimed to have the underly-
ing notes used to produce the Report, but failed to provide them before the ruling in the instant case.
One must wonder, how much did the Government's failure to provide notes or unredacted corroborat-
ing evidence subjectively influence the district court? Further, why was the Government unable to
provide such information? The author is not implying any bad faith on the part of the Government, but
merely suggesting that "meaningful review" is frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the Executive
Branch in the instant case. There is no doubt in this author's mind that in 2001, when Latif was cap-
tured, the battlefield environment was chaotic. But the Government should have been able to produce
at least some firsthand evidence outside of the Report to corroborate its case against Latif.
195. Id. (quoting Abdah v. Obama, No. 04-1254(HHK), 2010 WL 3270761 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
2010)).
196. Id. at 1218.
197. Id. at 1221-22.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1223-24.
200. Id.
201. Mark Deanbeaux, No Hearing Habeas. D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful Review, Seton Hall
University School of Law, 1 (May 1, 2012), http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PubliclntGovServ/pol-
icyresearch/upload/hearing-habeas.pdf
202. Id. at 2.
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twelve cases post Al-Adalzi, the district court granted Latif's petition and
denied the other eleven.20 Reversing Latif through evidentiary presump-
tions clearly compels increased judicial deference unlike any other decision
post Bounediene. 0 ' Latif is not merely the latest denial of habeas relief;
the instant case signifies a blanket contradiction of "meaningful review" by
the circuit court.
Scholars may question whether current cases are simply less viable.
Statistical deviations between the thirty-four cases pre Al-Adalzi and the
twelve cases post Al-Adalzi suggest otherwise.205 Before Al-Adalzi, the dis-
trict court rejected 40% of Government factual allegations. 06 Of the
twelve most recent cases, including Latif, the district court rejected only
14%.2' Further-and most significantly-the frequency in which the dis-
trict court avoided addressing evidentiary weight as to an individual allega-
tion rose from 12% pre Al-Adalzi to 27% post Al-Adalzi.20s This data
points not to weaker detainee petitions, but fluctuating priorities by the
district court. 09
A "presumption of regularity" is not inherently offensive to habeas
corpus litigation if applied judiciously and with proper regard to national
security interests. However, the presumption should be employed in a
manner that respects common sense application to each individual petition.
Unfortunately, the legal issues discussed here are not philosophical. Asym-
metrical warfare is a natural byproduct of increased interconnectivity be-
tween the United States and developing nations. Detainee litigation is a
reality of this new age of conflict. Whether detainees are held in Guanta-
namo Bay or some distant battlefield, the common law courts create today
will affect habeas proceedings far into the future.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2-3. In Professor Denbeaux's data, factual allegations are divided into four categories:
hostile acts, stays in terrorist guesthouses, terrorist training camp attendance, and route travel. Id.
Combined, these categories result in 85 Government allegations pre Al-Adahi, with the district court
rejecting 34. Id. The same categories result in 29 allegations post Al-Adahi, with the district court
rejecting only 4. Therefore, the rate of rejection decreases by over 65%.
208. Id. This statistic is troublesome for several reasons. First, it leaves practitioners with no infor-
mation as to which piece of evidence was most significant in swaying the court's decision. Second, it
may suggest that the district court is reacting to the circuit court's clear signal that detainees should be
granted release less frequently under the Al-Adahi framework. Id. at 11. Third, and of special interest
to this Note, scholars must wonder if by failing to address evidentiary weight, the district court is simply
avoiding the ambiguity created by Bouniediene as to what will be considered "meaningful review." If
the district court has no solid guidepost for proper review of detainee petitions, then the easiest way to
avoid reversal is to simply deny the petition without giving extensive analysis of each individual allega-
tion. But how can this ambiguity actually result in "meaningful review?" And practically speaking,
does the failure to address factual allegations hamper the detainee and his attorney's ability to properly
structure the detainee's legal argument against further detention?
209. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Some decrease would be expected if current
cases are factually weaker, but a 650% decrease implies the district court has changed its level of scrutiny
when reviewing Government evidence.
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A. Proper Deference: The Use of Uncorroborated Sources in
Detainee Litigation
The Supreme Court's decision in Haindi v. Ruinsfeld invited courts to
presume reliability of government evidence, but Haindi did not retract a
trial court's inherent fact-finding role.2to The plurality ruled that the "Con-
stitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Govern-
ment's evidence" if the evidence is "credible evidence that the habeas
petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria." 1 1 This passage, combined
with the presumption that government documents are reliable on their
face, would seem to endorse Judge Brown's ruling. However, Judge
Brown's error is not the presumption itself, but the presumption's applica-
tion in the instant case. The above language requires the trial court to first
conclude whether the Government's evidence is "credible." As the fact-
finder, the district court sits in the best position to make such determina-
tions. Therefore, the correct question to ask is not whether a "presumption
of regularity" is proper in detainee litigation, but whether the Government
produced sufficient "credible" evidence to establish the presumption
against Latif. The initial burden rests with the Government, not the peti-
tioner. In practice, the district court must establish the evidentiary stan-
dard for "credibility." If the bar is too high, the presumption is negated. If
the bar is too low, the court ignores "meaningful review."
A bright line "credibility" test is unnecessary in detainee litigation; in
fact, such a test would naturally, and unfairly, favor one party over the
other. Instead, a sliding-scale formula, accounting for individual variations
in each petition, would best ensure "meaningful review" and appropriate
judicial deference. The circuit court's ruling in Kahn v. Obaina exemplifies
a suitable blue print for applying the sliding-scale formula. Prosecutors
provided the district court with unredacted copies of government intelli-
gence reports and statements by Army interrogators. 13 This evidence neu-
tralizes what Judge Tatel questioned in Latif: the ambiguity of documents
produced on the battlefield through non-governmental actors.1 It would
be foolhardy to assume that such evidence will be available in every de-
tainee proceeding, but it would also be illogical for its absence to be ig-
nored in determining "credibility" for presumption purposes. Redactions
in Latif make factual errors in the Report difficult to thoroughly analyze,
but we do know that the district court found multiple inconsistencies, one
of which was apparently an "obvious mistake." 15 These errors, combined
with the lack of corroboration by the Government216 (particularly in the
210. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004).
211. Id.
212. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Riggs Nat'l Corp. v.
Comm'r, 295 F.3d 16, 21 (D. C. Cir. 2002).
213. Kahn v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
214. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
215. Id. at 1216-17.
216. Id.
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light of its corroboration in Kahn) are sufficient to negate clear "credibil-
ity" as envisioned under Handi. Like Kahn, the sliding-scale formula
should not turn on one single factor-the fact-finder must weigh each piece
of evidence together against the specific circumstances surrounding the de-
tainees' capture.
B. Evidentiarv Presunptions and Clear Error Review
Regardless of whether evidentiary presumptions are applied in de-
tainee litigation, Judge Brown's opinion effectively bypasses clear error re-
view. The facts in Latif do not justify continued detention under the newly
created "presumption of regularity" or under the previous "indicia of relia-
bility" standard. " By reversing the district court's order and applying the
presumption, Judge Brown evaluated the district court's findings of fact de
novo.
As stated, the Government must first put forth "credible" evidence to
establish the presumption.21" The Government did not meet this burden in
Latif-applying the presumption therefore substitutes the district court's
findings with the circuit court's own factual analysis. The district court im-
plicitly rejected the initial "credibility" of the Report through careful and
thorough assessment of the Report's allegations. " Nothing in the district
court's opinion suggests that applying the "presumption of regularity"
would result in continued detention. Even if the district court had assumed
accuracy in each of the Report's allegations, Judge Brown's "presumption"
"does not compel a determination that the [document] establishes what it is
offered to prove."220 The American judicial system places great responsi-
bility on district courts to act as expert fact-finders. Justice Kennedy stated
as much in Bornediene: the "Government has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that
the District Court will use its discretion to accommodate this interest to the
greatest extent possible." 1
Detainee litigation, like the rest of American jurisprudence, requires
appropriate deference to the district court's findings of fact. Applying this
logic to Latif highlights two areas of evidentiary concern. First, witness
"plausibility" or "credibility" is an important distinction: the detainee's
only defense may be his denial of the Government's accusations and his
own characterizations of the incidents leading to his detention. Secondly,
how should the district court view evidence that, on its own, fails to meet
the burden of continued detention?
217. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
218. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004).
219. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216. The district court's opinion does not explicitly mention evidentiary
presumptions.
220. Id. at 1181.
221. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008).
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1. Detainee "Credibility" With or Without Presumptions
Judge Brown's opinion requires the district court to determine not
whether the detainee's statements are merely "plausible," but actually
"credible" in the light of the evidence presented.m The first deficiency in
such logic derives from the systematic failure by the D.C. Circuit to specify
what will be deemed "credible."m What must the detainee present in re-
buttal to overcome the Government's allegations? Judge Brown cited mul-
tiple inconsistencies in the Government's Report and apparent
discrepancies between the Report and other evidence presented during the
district court's hearing.m Latif explained those inconsistencies with a
story that, though not necessarily the most convincing in the history of de-
tainee litigation, certainly raised serious doubts about the otherwise uncor-
roborated Report.
The second failure inherent in Judge Brown's "credibility" require-
ment couples with her use of the "presumption of regularity" in the instant
case. Judge Brown held "[o]nly a credible story could overcome the pre-
sumption of regularity to which the Report was entitled."" 5  Therefore,
once the Government brings "credible" evidence forward that the detainee
is an actual "enemy combatant," his rebuttal as a witness must meet the
same "credibility" standard. But the Report itself-without further cor-
roboration-can hardly be considered "credible." Demanding "credible"
evidence from the detainee when the Government cannot meet its own
burden lacks even the basic spirit of fairness. Until the district court suffi-
ciently establishes the "credibility" bar, detainees are left with yet another
ambiguous evidentiary constraint.m
2. Evidentiary "Atomization" or Common Sense Evaluation?
Judge Brown ruled that the district court erred when it viewed the
evidence against Latif in isolation and not within a larger framework, and
that this error was a mistake of law, not fact.' Yet Judge Brown relied on
the Report itself as the starting point for each isolated allegation."2 Thus,
222. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1190.
223. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The circuit court seems to struggle with creating
exceptions to accommodate the difficulties inherent in detainee litigation. This is understandable, as no
easy answer exists for how to conduct habeas proceedings without encroaching on either the detainee's
liberty or the nation's security. But that is precisely why a reviewing court, if it is to make a new
requirement in detainee litigation common law, must do as much as possible to give lower courts con-
crete examples of what it intends for future proceedings. In review of the district court's findings in
Latif, it becomes difficult to see how Latif's statements were not "credible" in light of the court's opin-
ion. Would this case actually be different if the district court had simply used the word "credible"
instead of "plausible?" Judge Brown's opinion certainly states so, but the circuit court's open rejection
of Latif's statements leaves this author unconvinced.
224. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1186.
225. Id. at 1190.
226. Even if the district court applies a lower bar for meeting the "credibility" requirement, there
is no guarantee that the detainees' "credibility" requirement will, in practice, match the Government's
burden.
227. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1193.
228. Id. at 1194.
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Judge Brown required the district court to place greater emphasis on the
sections of the Report that implicated Latif, and less on the sections that
matched his statements.2" This supposed evidentiary balancing is no dif-
ferent than the district court's hypothetical "atomization." In reality, the
district court simply weighed the evidence of Latif's statements against an
uncorroborated, deeply censored, and questionable Government intelli-
gence report, within the backdrop of the Government's failure to provide
notes or other information about the Report.
District courts must view all of the evidence together before determin-
ing a detainee's enemy combatant status, and this principle is sensible given
the use of hearsay evidence. Each thread of the overall story becomes tre-
mendously important, particularly because of the risk involved with releas-
ing persons who may one day return to the battlefield. 3 0 Courts accept the
proposition that some pieces of evidence will either contain factual errors
or outright misstatements by persons accusing the detainee. This is pre-
cisely why the district court should be given latitude to discount evidence it
considers untrustworthy. The district court did not "atomize" the evidence,
but merely chose to accept the facts differently than Judge Brown or Judge
Henderson. The appellate court cannot "reverse the finding of the trier of
fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case
differently." 3 1
C. Workable Solutions in Detainee Litigation: The Spirit of Justice in
21st Century Warfare
Thorough analysis reveals gaps in the D.C. Circuit's approach to de-
tainee habeas petitions from both procedural and evidentiary viewpoints.
However, problems require solutions, and it is imperative that legal schol-
ars strive now to create workable remedies in detainee litigation. The
Global War on Terrorism stands as a wake-up call to democratic nations in
the 21st Century. Some detainees will indefinitely pose risk to the United
States' national security. The careful balance between American interests
and democratic ideals cannot be overstated. Judge Brown was simply in-
correct when she stated in Latif that detainee litigation is a "shrinking cate-
gory of cases" and that "the benefit of intelligence that might be gained-
even from high-value detainees-is outweighed by the systemic cost of de-
fending detention decisions. "1232 Detainees may not be sent to Guanta-
namo Bay, but that does not mean alleged terrorist members will no longer
be captured in combat operations. Further, as shown in Handi, the United
States must be prepared to conduct habeas proceedings when one of its
own citizens affiliates with designated terror groups.
229. Id.
230. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
231. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
232. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1199 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)). But even if Judge Brown is correct, would that fact matter from the standpoint of justice? In
other words, do current detainees deserve less judicial review because the issue of detainee litigation
may one day become moot?
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
1. Can Civilian Courts Properly Determine "Enemy Combatant"
Status?
It may seem redundant to ponder whether civilian courts are capable
of balancing the great need of national security against detainee liberty.
Certainly the D.C. Circuit continues to do so on a daily basis, and Latif is
but one of over sixty-three cases decided post Boumnediene .2 Neverthe-
less, our analysis looks not to current affairs, but the future of detainee
litigation-whether or not detainees are held in Guantanamo Bay, the
United States, or Afghanistan's Parwan Detention Facility. In reality,
civilian judges likely have no less expertise in deciding enemy combatant
status than military judges. Whether a uniformed officer or experienced
jurist, the reviewing judge must wade through highly classified intelligence
reports to decipher if the detainee in fact meets the "enemy combatant"
criteria. Of course, military judges may have more familiarity with military
language and war-fighting procedures. But that does not mean civilian
judges are incapable of learning such information.
The simplest solution is to allow civilian judges full and unfettered ac-
cess to unredacted copies of Government intelligence reports. 3 The Gov-
ernment allowed such access in Kahn, 236 proving that it is possible for both
branches of government to work together for judicially sound habeas re-
view. "Meaningful review" of enemy detention does not just require any
type of judicial review; it requires the Government to conduct proceedings
that assure the American people that liberty has not been squashed in the
name of national security. The United States must also consider its place
as the global leader for democracy. If Americans expect other countries to
protect human rights, they must be prepared to do so even when it is most
inconvenient. Civilian review signals deep commitment to the ideals of lib-
erty and justice that make the United States Constitution an example for
the rest of the international community.
2. How Should Civilian Courts Conduct Habeas Proceedings?
The current system of habeas review can serve as a proper means for
evaluating detainee enemy combatant status; however, concrete examples
of practical safeguards must be determined so that courts will uniformly
apply basic protections. The Supreme Court could have used Bornedine,
Handi, or Rasul to hand down guidance for district courts to operate
233. Deanbeaux, supra note 201, at 4-5.
234. The United States turned over the Parwan Detention Facility at Bagram Air Base, Afghani-
stan to the Afghan government on September 10, 2012. Richard Leiby, U.S. Transfers Control of
Bagram Prison to Afghan Officials, WASHINGTON PosT (Sept. 10, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.
com/2012-09-10/world/35494546_1_prison-handover-afghan-control-afghan-troops.
235. Allocations could be made for protecting sources and methods. The exact name of the for-
eign source might not be necessary, or code names for American clandestine officers could be substi-
tuted. The point is primarily that the Executive Branch persuades the reviewing judge that the
information presented is both reliable and accurate. Surely the Executive Branch cannot argue that
Article III judges are untrustworthy with confidential information.
236. Kahn v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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under. Instead, district courts are left with the ambiguous "invitation to
innovate" that Judge Brown uses for her "presumption of regularity."3 7
As argued above, the most important reason to keep detainee litigation in
civilian courts is to preserve the fundamental fairness associated with
American jurisprudence. Highly restrictive controls would encroach on
such fairness, but the absence of controls leaves district courts without
much needed supervision.
Logically, absent precedent otherwise, courts should follow a familiar
and proven evidentiary rule set: standard federal criminal procedure. From
that baseline, accepted deviances can then be justified through careful anal-
ysis. 38 Judge Kennedy wrote in Bowonediene "[h]abeas corpus proceedings
need not resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention is by executive
order. But the writ must be effective. 2 Just because detainee litigation
must not "resemble" criminal trial does not mean that important safe-
guards should not be borrowed from federal criminal law. Wholesale
adoption of the more formalistic aspects of federal criminal procedure
would clearly overburden the district court; the point is not that detainees
actually receive criminal trials, only that courts avoid haphazardly applying
evidentiary exceptions.
It is from the federal criminal procedure baseline that judges can then
begin to justify evidentiary standards such as the "presumption of regular-
ity" or witness "credibility" requirements. If judges do not compare their
deviations to some type of accepted proceeding, detainee litigation begins
to resemble what Judge Tatel feared in Latif: courts "mov[ing] the goal
posts"24 0 when the Government otherwise fails to meet its burden for con-
tinued detention. That fear is even more pronounced in the light of Judge
Brown's refusal to accept the district court's findings of fact in Latif.
Whether or not a "presumption of regularity" applied to the Report, Judge
Brown's opinion abandoned a bedrock principle of jurisprudence. 41 In
federal criminal law this error would create grounds for reversal at the Su-
preme Court, but post Bornediene the Court has avoided granting review
of detainee petitions. Latif therefore stands as principle example of why
courts must replace "innovation" with "standardization."
237. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1181.
238. These deviations will then of course be subject to review by the circuit court and the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court may then either accept the deviance or hand down a more appropriate rule.
At first glance, that seems to be what Bownediene intended, but Bownediene's inherent ambiguity
under the "invitation to innovate" goes too far to the other extreme. The most promising method
would be for the Supreme Court itself to create model procedures through appropriate consultation
with the Executive Branch.
239. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008).
240. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1206 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
241. See supra note 90.
242. Lyle Denniston, Court Bypasses All New Detainee Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (June 11, 2012,
11:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/court-bypasses-all-new-detainee-cases/.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
3. Looking Past Guantanamo Bay: Detainee Litigation at Home and
Abroad
The Supreme Court could solve "standardization" and alleviate many
of the questions plaguing current detainee litigation in the D.C. Circuit.
The Court is capable of providing strong leadership without micromanag-
ing habeas proceedings, particularly in the procedural sphere of evidentiary
standards. Critics might counter with Judge Brown's statement that de-
tainee litigation is a "shrinking category of cases."'42 But scholars and
practitioners must remember that the precedents set now will directly af-
fect the way in which the United States approaches detainee litigation in
the future. The detainees left in Guantanamo Bay will not be the last pris-
oners apprehended by the United States and held without trial as "enemy
combatants."
If the United States can develop workable habeas review procedures,
it might discourage Executive Branch actors from purposely avoiding civil-
ian oversight. Most worrisome is the incentive for the Executive Branch to
detain alleged terrorists in foreign jails or battlefields. This incentive
strikes to the very core of what the American judicial system seeks to pre-
vent: deprivation of liberty without oversight, review, or accountability.
The stakes are high for all three branches of government, and no decision
in this area of law results in perfect outcomes. But if Americans wish to
preserve liberty, Latif cannot be the ending point for detainee habeas
proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ignoring procedural and evidentiary issues discussed in this Note may
result in consequences unintended by the Supreme Court and the Execu-
tive Branch. These consequences do not only affect current detainees like
Latif. Future conflicts, on or off declared battlefields, will result in cap-
tured terrorist suspects who deserve some type of civilian judicial review.
Executive Branch officials represent an honorable competing interest-se-
curing American citizens from future terrorist attacks. If the judiciary fails
in its competing interest-the creation of fair and open procedural safe-
guards-then the Executive Branch cannot be blamed for overzealous ac-
tions. If detainee litigation taught legal scholars anything over the past
eleven years of conflict, it is that preparation now avoids haphazard appli-
cation of just principles later. The Supreme Court must accept detainee
appeals in its next term and provide leadership in concrete language that
affords the D.C. Circuit guideposts for conducting proper habeas review.
The stakes are too high for continued inaction. Detainees live, and in the
case of Latif, die in United States custody absent true "meaningful review"
of their "enemy combatant" status. This precedent extends not only to for-
eign citizens, but American citizens as well. Though witness "plausibility"
243. Latif, 677 F.3d at 1199.
[VOL. 32:503528
2014] PUTTING MEANINGFUL BACK IN MEANINGFUL REVIEW 529
versus "credibility" and document "presumptions" are worthy topics of dis-
cussion, they are but part of a larger framework of injustice. If the United
States expects to be a true leader of global democracy, it cannot afford to
continue the ambiguous habeas corpus policy found in Latif v. Obana.

